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A Game Theoretic Approach to Distributed
Opportunistic Scheduling
Albert Banchs, Andre´s Garcı´a-Saavedra, Pablo Serrano and Joerg Widmer
Abstract—Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling (DOS) is in-
herently harder than conventional opportunistic scheduling due
to the absence of a central entity that has knowledge of all the
channel states. With DOS, stations contend for the channel using
random access; after a successful contention, they measure the
channel conditions and only transmit in case of a good channel,
while giving up the transmission opportunity when the channel
conditions are poor. The distributed nature of DOS systems
makes them vulnerable to selfish users: by deviating from the
protocol and using more transmission opportunities, a selfish user
can gain a greater share of the wireless resources at the expense
of the well-behaved users. In this paper, we address the selfishness
problem in DOS from a game theoretic standpoint. We propose
an algorithm that satisfies the following properties: (i) when all
stations implement the algorithm, the wireless network is driven
to the optimal point of operation, and (ii) one or more selfish
stations cannot gain any profit by deviating from the algorithm.
The key idea of the algorithm is to react to a selfish station by
using a more aggressive configuration that (indirectly) punishes
this station. We build on multivariable control theory to design a
mechanism for punishment that on the one hand is sufficiently
severe to prevent selfish behavior while on the other hand is light
enough to guarantee that, in the absence of selfish behavior, the
system is stable and converges to the optimum point of operation.
We conduct a game theoretic analysis based on repeated games to
show the algorithm’s effectiveness against selfish stations. These
results are confirmed by extensive simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Opportunistic scheduling techniques have been shown to
provide substantial performance improvements in wireless
networks. These techniques take advantage of the fluctuations
in the channel conditions of the different wireless stations; by
selecting the station with the best instantaneous channel for
data transmission, opportunistic scheduling can utilize wireless
resource more efficiently. A key assumption of most oppor-
tunistic scheduling techniques [1], [2] is that the scheduler is
centralized and has knowledge of the instantaneous channel
conditions of all stations.
Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling (DOS) techniques
[3]–[6] have been proposed only recently. In contrast to
centralized schemes, with DOS each station has to make
scheduling decisions without knowledge of the channel con-
ditions of the other stations. Stations contend for the channel
using random access with a given access probability. After
successful contention, a station measures the channel and, in
case of poor channel conditions (i.e., when the instantaneous
transmission rate is below a given threshold), the station
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gives up the transmission opportunity. This allows all stations
to recontend for the channel, letting a station with better
conditions win the contention, which increases the overall
throughput. In this way, DOS techniques exploit both multi-
user diversity across stations and time diversity across slots.
The absence of global channel information makes DOS
systems very vulnerable to selfish users. By deviating from
the above protocol and using a more aggressive configuration,
a selfish user can easily gain a greater share of the wireless
resources at the expense of the other, well-behaved users. In
this paper, we address the selfishness problem in DOS from a
game theoretic standpoint. In our formulation of the problem,
the players are the wireless stations that implement DOS
and strive to obtain as much resources as possible from the
wireless network. We show that, in the absence of penalties,
the wireless network naturally tends to either great unfairness
or network collapse. Following this result, we design a penalty
mechanism in which any player who misbehaves will be pun-
ished by other players in such a way that there is no incentive
to misbehave. A key challenge when designing such a penalty
scheme is to carefully adjust the punishment inflicted upon a
misbehaving station. On the one hand side, if the punishment is
too light, a selfish station may still benefit from misbehaving.
On the other hand, an overreaction may itself be interpreted as
misbehavior and could trigger punishment by other stations,
leading to an endless spiral of increasing punishments and
a throughput collapse. Addressing this challenge through a
combination of game theory and multivariable control theory
is a key part of our design.
The most relevant prior work on DOS by Zheng et al. [3]
sets the basic foundations of distributed opportunistic schedul-
ing. The authors propose a mechanism based on optimal
stopping theory and analyze its performance both with well-
behaved and with selfish users. The aim of the algorithm is to
maximize the total throughput of the network. [4]–[6] extend
the basic mechanism of [3] by analyzing the case of imperfect
channel information [4], improving channel estimation through
two-level channel probing [5], and incorporating delay con-
straints [6]. While our algorithm deals with the basic DOS
mechanism of [3], it could be extended with the enhancements
of [4]–[6]. The key contributions of our work are:
1) We perform a joint optimization of both the transmission
rate thresholds and the access probabilities, while [3]
only optimizes the thresholds.
2) We provide a proportionally fair allocation that achieves
a good tradeoff between total throughput and fairness,
while [3] maximizes the total throughput of the network,
which may lead to starvation of the stations with poor
2channel conditions.
3) We propose a simple algorithm based on control theory
that guarantees stability and quick convergence to the
optimal point of operation, in contrast to the compara-
tively complex heuristics of [3].
4) Our game theoretic analysis considers that users can
selfishly configure both their access probability and
transmission rate threshold, while the analysis of [3]
assumes that selfish users can only maliciously configure
the thresholds.
5) We use a penalty mechanism to force an optimal Nash
equilibrium, while [3] introduces a pricing mechanism
for this purpose, which may not be practical in many
scenarios; additionally, the performance of the pricing
mechanism heavily depends on the cost parameter and
even in the best case is only suboptimal.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we present an analysis of our system and derive the
optimal configuration of access probabilities and transmission
rate thresholds. In Section III we show that, in the absence of
penalties, the wireless network tends to a highly undesirable
resource allocation; based on this, we propose an algorithm
named Distributed Opportunistic scheduling with distributed
Control (DOC) that avoids this situation by implementing a
decentralized penalty mechanism that controls selfish behavior
through punishments. Section IV shows by means of control
theory, that when all the stations implement DOC, the system
stably converges to the optimal point of operation obtained in
Section II. In Section V we conduct a game theoretic analysis
of DOC to show that stations cannot gain any profit from
behaving selfishly. The performance of the proposed scheme
is extensively evaluated through simulations in Section VI.
Finally, Section VII provides some concluding remarks.
II. ANALYSIS AND OPTIMAL CONFIGURATION
In the following we present our system model and analyze
the throughput as a function of the access probabilities and
transmission rate thresholds. We then compute the optimal
configuration of these parameters for a proportionally fair
throughput allocation, which is well known to provide a good
tradeoff between total throughput and fairness [7].
A. System Model
Our system model follows that of [3]–[6]. We consider a
single-hop wireless network with N stations, where station
i contends for the channel with an access probability pi. A
collision model is assumed for the channel access, where the
channel contention of a station is successful if no other station
contends at the same time. Let τ denote the duration of a mini
slot for channel contention, which can either be empty, or can
contain a successful contention or a collision.
As in [3]–[6], we assume that a station i obtains its local
channel conditions after a successful contention. Let Ri(θ)
denote the corresponding transmission rate at time θ. If Ri(θ)
is small (indicating a poor channel), station i gives up on this
transmission opportunity and lets all the stations recontend.
Otherwise, it transmits for a duration of T . Fig. 1 depicts
Idle
successful
contention
collision
data
transmission
W W W W
ii
RR )(T
ii
RR t)(T
Fig. 1. Channel contention example.
an example of such channel contention. Our model, like
that of [3]–[6], assumes that Ri(θ) remains constant for the
duration of a data transmission and that different observations
of Ri(θ) are independent.1 From [3], we have that the optimal
transmission policy is a threshold policy: for a given threshold
R¯i, station i only transmits after a successful contention if
Ri(θ) ≥ R¯i.
B. Throughput Analysis
The throughput ri achieved by station i is a function of the
parameters pi and R¯i. Let li be the average number of bits
that station i transmits upon a successful contention and Ti be
the average time it holds the channel. Then, the throughput of
station i is
ri =
ps,ili∑
j ps,jTj + (1− ps)τ
(1)
where ps,i is the probability that a mini slot contains a
successful contention of station i
ps,i = pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) (2)
and ps is the probability that it contains any successful
contention
ps =
∑
i
ps,i (3)
Both li and Ti depend on R¯i. Upon a successful contention,
a station holds the channel for a time T +τ in case it transmits
data and τ in case it gives up the transmission opportunity.
Thus, Ti can be computed as
Ti = Prob(Ri(θ) < R¯i)τ + Prob(Ri(θ) ≥ R¯i)(T + τ) (4)
In case the station uses the transmission opportunity, it
transmits a number of bits given by Ri(θ)Ti, which yields
li =
∫ ∞
R¯i
rTifRi(r)dr (5)
where fRi(r) is the pdf of Ri(θ).
With the above, we can compute ri from p = {p1, . . . , pN}
and R¯ = {R¯1, . . . , R¯N}. In the following, we obtain the opti-
mal configuration of these parameters to provide proportional
fairness.
1The assumption that Ri(θ) remains constant during a data transmission is
a standard assumption for the block-fading channel in wireless communica-
tions [8], [9], while the assumption that different observations are independent
is justified in [3] through numerical calculations.
3C. Optimal pi configuration
We start by computing the optimal configuration of pi. Let
us define wi as
wi =
ps,i
ps,1
(6)
where we take station 1 as reference. From the above equation
we have that ps,i = wips/
∑
j wj and substituting this in
Eq. (1) yields
ri =
wipsli∑
j wjpsTj +
∑
j wj(1− ps)τ
(7)
In a slotted wireless system such as the one of this paper,
the optimal success probability is approximately 1/e [10]. The
problem of finding the p configuration that maximizes the
proportionally fair rate allocation is thus equivalent to finding
the values wi that maximize
∑
i log(ri) given that ps = 1/e.
To obtain these wi values, we impose
∂
∑
i log(ri)
∂wi
= 0 (8)
which yields
1
wi
−N
psTi + (1 − ps)τ∑
i wipsTi +
∑
j wj(1− ps)τ
= 0 (9)
Combining this expression for wi and wj , we obtain
wi
wj
=
psTj + (1 − ps)τ
psTi + (1− ps)τ
(10)
From the above, the solution to the optimization problem is
given by the values of p resulting from solving the following
system of equations:
∑
i
pi
∏
j 6=i
(1− pj) =
1
e
(11)
pi
∏
j 6=i 1− pj
p1
∏
j 6=1 1− pj
=
T1 + τ(1/ps − 1)
Ti + τ(1/ps − 1)
, i = 2, . . . , N (12)
This system of equations has two solutions, since 1/e is
only an approximation to the truly optimal success probability.
For one of the solutions, all of the access probabilities are
larger than the corresponding ones from the other. We select
the solution with the larger access probabilities, denoted by
p∗ = {p∗1, . . . , p
∗
N}, and refer to them as the optimal access
probabilities.
Note that determining p∗ above requires computing Ti ∀i,
which depend on the optimal configuration of the thresholds
R¯. In the following section we address the computation of the
optimal R¯, which we denote by R¯∗ = {R¯∗1, . . . , R¯∗N}.
D. Optimal R¯i configuration
In order to obtain the optimal configuration of R¯, we need
to find the transmission threshold of each station that, given
the p∗ computed above, optimizes the overall performance in
terms of proportional fairness. This is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. Let us consider that station k is alone in the
channel and it contends for the channel with pk = 1/e.
Let R¯1k be the transmission rate threshold that optimizes the
throughput of this station under the assumption that different
channel observations are independent. Then, R¯∗k = R¯1k.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there
exists a configuration R¯∗ with R¯∗k 6= R¯1k for some station k
that provides proportional fairness.
Let l1k and T 1k be the values of lk and Tk for the threshold
R¯1k and l∗k and T ∗k the corresponding values for R¯∗k. Since R¯1k
maximizes rk when station k is alone:
l1k
T 1k + (e − 1)τ
>
l∗k
T ∗k + (e − 1)τ
(13)
Let us consider that there are N stations in the network and
the configuration R¯∗ is used. Given R¯∗, the p∗ that maximizes∑
i log(ri) is given by Eqs. (11) and (12). This leads to the
following throughput for station k:
r∗k =
p∗s,kl
∗
k∑
j p
∗
s,j(T
∗
j + (e− 1)τ)
=
l∗k
N(T ∗k + (e − 1)τ)
(14)
and for the other stations:
r∗i =
l∗i
N(T ∗i + (e− 1)τ)
, ∀i 6= k (15)
Let us now consider the alternative configuration R¯1k for
station k and R¯∗i for the other stations. Let us take the p1k
and p1i configuration that satisfies Eqs. (11) and (12) with this
alternative configuration. This yields the following throughput
for station k:
r1k =
l1k
N(T 1k + (e − 1)τ)
> r∗k (16)
and for the other stations:
r∗i =
l∗i
N(T ∗i + (e− 1)τ)
, ∀i 6= k (17)
With the above, we have found an alternative configuration
that provides a higher throughput to station k and the same
throughput to all other stations. Therefore, this alternative con-
figuration increases
∑
i log(ri), which contradicts the initial
assumption that the configuration R¯∗ provides proportional
fairness.
Following the above theorem, the optimal configuration of
the thresholds R¯∗ can be computed based on optimal stopping
theory. This is done in [3] which finds that the optimal
threshold R¯∗i can be obtained by solving the following fixed
point equation:
E
(
Ri(θ)− R¯
∗
i
)+
=
R¯∗i τ
T /e
(18)
The above concludes the search for the optimal configura-
tion. The key advantage of this configuration is that it allows
each station to compute its R¯∗i based on local information
only, which decouples the computation of R¯∗i from that of p∗i .
Based on this finding, we now present a distributed mechanism
to compute the optimal configuration where each station uses
a fixed R¯i = R¯∗i obtained locally, together with an adaptive
algorithm to determine the optimal p∗i .
4III. DOC ALGORITHM
In this section we propose an adaptive algorithm that
satisfies the following properties: (i) when all stations im-
plement the algorithm, it leads to the optimal configuration
computed above, and (ii) a selfish station cannot gain profit by
deviating from the algorithm. We first motivate our algorithm
by showing that, in the absence of punishments, the system
will naturally tend to a highly undesirable point of operation.
Then, we present our algorithm which uses punishments to
drive the system to the optimal point of operation obtained in
the previous section.
A. Motivation
If no constrains are imposed on the wireless network and
stations are allowed to configure their {pi, R¯i} parameters to
selfishly maximize their profit, the network will not naturally
tend to the optimum configuration above. In order to show
this, we model the wireless system as a static game in which
each station can choose its configuration without suffering
any penalty. The following theorem characterizes the Nash
equilibria of this game.
Theorem 2. In absence of penalties, there is at least one
station that plays pi = 1 in any Nash equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there
is a Nash equilibrium such that pj 6= 1 ∀j. Now take one
player i with throughput
ri =
pi
∏
j 6=i (1− pj)li
piTˆi + (1− pi)Tˆ−i
(19)
where Tˆi is the average duration the channel is occupied
when station i transmits and Tˆ−i is the average duration of
a transmission or an empty mini slot when station i does not
transmit.
Taking the partial derivative we have
∂ri
∂pi
=
∏
j 6=i (1− pj)liTˆ−i(
piTˆi + (1− pi)Tˆ−i
)2 > 0 (20)
It can be seen that the throughput ri is a strictly increasing
function of pi (given that the R¯i configuration as well as the
configuration of the other stations does not change).
From the above follows that {pi, R¯i}, with pi 6= 1, is not
the best strategy for player i given the configuration of the
other stations, since i would obtain a higher throughput for
pi = 1 and the same R¯i. Thus, this solution is not a Nash
equilibrium, which contradicts our initial assumption.
Any of the above Nash equilibria are highly undesirable.
If station i is the only one that plays pi = 1, then player
i achieves non-zero throughput while all other players have
zero throughput. Conversely, any other station j also playing
pj = 1 results in a network collapse and all players obtain
zero throughput.
We conclude from the above that, in the absence of punish-
ments, selfish behaviors will severely degrade the performance
of the wireless system. In the following, we propose an
algorithm that addresses this problem by implementing a
distributed punishment mechanism.
B. Rationale behind the algorithm
Before presenting the algorithm, we first discuss the ratio-
nale that lies behind its design. This rationale heavily relies on
the notion of channel time that a station obtains over a certain
interval, defined as
ti =
ni∑
j=1
(Ti(j) + (e− 1)τ) (21)
where ni is the number of successful contentions of station i
in that period and Ti(j) is the duration of the jth successful
contention of the station. The above definition comprises
the aggregated transmission time of the station plus a fixed
overhead of (e − 1)τ that is added every time the station
accesses the channel.
An important observation that drives the design of our
algorithm is that, with the configuration of Section II, all
stations receive the same channel time, i.e., ti = tj ∀i, j. This
can be seen as follows. From Eq. (21) we have that over a
given interval,
ti
tj
=
ni (Ti + (e− 1)τ)
nj (Tj + (e − 1)τ)
=
ps,i(Ti + (e− 1)τ)
ps,j(Tj + (e − 1)τ)
(22)
since by definition ni/nj = ps,i/ps,j . Furthermore, from
Eq. (12) we have ps,i(Ti + (e − 1)τ) = ps,j(Tj + (e − 1)τ)
and thus ti = tj .
Since the overhead in the definition of channel time, (e −
1)τ , coincides with the average time between two successes
for the optimal configuration, from the above follows that,
when all stations use the optimal configuration over a given
time interval Ttotal, they all observe the same optimal channel
time t∗,
t∗ = Ttotal/N (23)
The last observation upon which our algorithm relies is that
as long as a selfish station does not receive more channel time
than t∗, it cannot increase its throughput. The throughput of
a station with a given channel time and R¯i is equal to the
throughput it would obtain if it were alone in the channel
during this time with pi = 1/e and the same R¯i. From
Theorem 1, we have that this throughput is maximized for
the optimal transmission rate threshold R¯∗i . Therefore, as long
as the station does not receive extra channel time, it will not
be able to achieve a higher throughput.
Given these observations, we base our algorithm on the
following principles: (i) if a given station i detects that another
station k is receiving a larger channel time than itself, then
station k is considered selfish and punished by station i, and
(ii) when punishing station k, station i needs to make sure the
punishment is severe enough so that station k’s channel time
remains below t∗ and thus it cannot benefit from misbehaving.
C. Algorithm design
The DOC algorithm aims at driving the system to the
optimal configuration {p∗, R¯∗} obtained in Section II. As
discussed in Section II-D, the optimal configuration of R¯i can
be computed locally by each station independently of the other
stations. Therefore, with DOC each station maintains a fixed
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R¯i (equal to the optimal value) and implements an adaptive
algorithm to configure its access probability pi.
Time is divided into intervals in such a way that each
station updates its access probability pi at the beginning of
an interval. The central idea behind DOC is that when a
misbehaving station is detected, the other stations increase
their access probabilities in subsequent intervals to prevent
the selfish station from benefiting from the misbehavior.
A key challenge in DOC is to carefully adjust the reaction
against a selfish station. If the reaction is not severe enough,
a selfish station may benefit from misbehaving, but if the
reaction is too severe, the system may turn unstable by entering
an endless loop where all stations indefinitely increase their
pi to punish each other.
Control theory is a particularly suitable tool to address this
challenge, since it helps to guarantee the convergence and
stability of adaptive algorithms. We use techniques from multi-
variable control theory [11] for the design of the DOC algo-
rithm. The algorithm is based on the classic system illustrated
in Fig. 2, where each station runs an independent controller
in order to compute its configuration. The controller that we
have chosen for this paper is a proportional-integral (PI)
controller, a well known controller from classic control theory
that has been used by a number of networking algorithms in
the literature [12]–[14].
As shown in the figure, the PI controller of station i takes
the error signal Ei as input and provides the control signal
Pi as output. The error signal serves to evaluate the state of
the system. If the system is operating as desired, the error
signal of all stations is zero. Otherwise, the error is non-zero
and we need to drive the system from its current state to the
desired point of operation. In order to do this, the PI controller
adjusts the control signal Pi by (appropriately) increasing it
when Ei > 0 and decreasing it otherwise. In the following,
we address the design of Pi and Ei.
D. Control signal Pi
The goal of the adaptive algorithm implemented by the
controller of a station is to adjust the access probability pi
with which the station contends. Hence, there needs to be a
one-to-one mapping between the control signal Pi and pi. In
addition, we impose that in the optimal point of operation, the
Pi values of all stations are the same. This latter requirement
is necessary to obtain the conditions for stability in Section IV.
Based on the above requirements, we design Pi as
Pi =
pi
1− pi
(Ti + (e− 1)τ) (24)
Hence, a station can compute its pi from the control signal
Pi as
pi =
Pi
Ti + (e− 1)τ + Pi
(25)
E. Error signal Ei
The design of the error signal Ei has the following two
goals: (i) selfish stations should not be able to obtain extra
channel time from the wireless network by using a configura-
tion different from the optimal one, and (ii) as long as there
are no selfish stations, p should converge to the optimal p∗.
To this end, each station measures its channel time as well
as that of the other stations at the end of every interval and
computes the error signal
Ei =
∑
j 6=i
(tj − ti)− Fi (26)
where Fi is a function that we design below. The error signal
Ei consists of the two components:
• The first component (∑j 6=i tj − ti) punishes selfish sta-
tions. If a station i receives less channel time than the
other stations, this component will be positive and hence
station i will increase its access probability pi.
• The second component (Fi) drives the system to the
desired point of operation in the absence of selfish
behavior (i.e., when all stations receive the same channel
time).
We next address the design of the function Fi. In order to
drive the current p to the desired p∗ when ti = tj ∀i, j, we
need Fi > 0 for pi > p∗i , such that in this case pi decreases,
and Fi < 0 for pi < p∗i .
Another requirement when designing Fi is that selfish
stations should not be able to obtain more channel time than t∗.
We first consider the case where all stations are well-behaved
and run the DOC algorithm except one that is selfish. In this
case, the error signal allows that the selfish station obtains an
additional channel time equal to Fi: taking Ei = 0 and setting
ti = t for all stations but the selfish one, the channel time tk
of the selfish station is given as
tk = t+ Fi (27)
As argued before, Fi needs to be small enough such that
tk ≤ t
∗ (28)
Combining the two equations above yields
tk + (N − 1)t+ (N − 1)Fi ≤ Nt
∗ (29)
Using
∑
j tj = tk + (N − 1)t we can isolate Fi and obtain
Fi ≤
1
N − 1
D (30)
6where D is defined as2
D = Nt∗ −
∑
j
tj (31)
With this constraint on Fi, the additional channel time
obtained by a selfish station does not compensate for the
overall efficiency loss due to sub-optimal access probabilities,
and hence a selfish station cannot benefit from misbehaving.
In addition, multiple selfish stations should not be able to
gain any aggregated channel time by playing a coordinated
strategy. We consider m selfish stations and again set the ti
of the other stations equal to t. From Ei = 0 we have
m∑
j=1
tj = mt+ Fi (32)
and we require that
m∑
j=1
tj ≤ mt
∗ (33)
Combining the above equations and isolating Fi yields
Fi ≤
m
N −m
D (34)
Eqs. (30) and (34) provide the maximum value for Fi that
still prevents one or more selfish stations to benefit from
misbehaving. Given all these requirements, we design Fi as:
Fi =
{
min((N − 1)D,D/N), pi > p
min
i
min((N − 1)D,−D/N, (N − 1)∆), pi ≤ p
min
i (35)
where pmin = {pmin1 , . . . , pminN } are the access probabilities
that minimize D subject to ti = tj ∀i, j and ∆ is the value
that D takes at this point,
∆ = D|p=pmin (36)
The above design satisfies Eqs. (30) and (34) and fulfills
Fi > 0 for pi > p∗i and Fi < 0 for pi < p∗i (when
ti = tj ∀i, j). It thus meets all the requirements set above for
function Fi. Note that the term D/N ensures that Eqs. (30)
and (34) are satisfied when D > 0, the term (N−1)D ensures
that they are satisfied when D < 0, and the terms (N − 1)∆
and −D/N ensure that Fi < 0 when ti = tj ∀i, j and pi < p∗i ,
as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Note that we keep Fi very close to the upper bound for
pi > p
∗
i , which means that the degree of punishment inflicted
upon selfish stations is as small as the above requirements
allow. The rationale for this design is that any punishment in
the form of an increase in access probabilities affects selfish
stations and well-behaved stations alike. Providing just enough
punishment to prevent any throughput gain for selfish stations
maintains the highest level of overall throughput for the system
in the presence of malicious users or in transient conditions.
Following a similar rationale, we keep Fi well below the upper
bound for pi < p∗i .
2Note that D is a function of the efficiency in channel contention, which
depends on p: if channel contention is more efficient, we have a larger number
of data transmissions in the interval, which results in a larger sum of channel
times and therefore a smaller D.
pi
Fi
pi*pi
min
(N-1)Δ
(N-1)Δ
-D/N
(N-1)D
D/N
Fig. 3. Fi as a function of pi when ti = tj ∀i, j.
This concludes the design of the algorithm. In the following
two sections, we analytically evaluate its performance when
all stations are well-behaved (Section IV) and when some of
them behave selfishly (Section V).
IV. DOC ANALYSIS
We first analyze the wireless system under steady state
conditions and show that it is driven to the desired point of
operation obtained in Section II. We then conduct a transient
analysis and derive the sufficient conditions for stability.
A. Steady state analysis
Since the controller includes an integrator, there is no steady
state error [15] and the steady solution can be obtained from
Ei = 0 ∀i (37)
Using Eqs. (26) and (35), Ei can be computed from ti and
t∗, which allows expressing Eq. (37) as a system of equations
of p. The following theorem guarantees the uniqueness of this
system of equations and shows that the unique stable point in
steady state is the desired point of operation from Section II.3
Theorem 3. The unique stable point of operation of the system
in steady state is p = p∗.
Proof: Let us consider two stations i and j. From Eq. (37)
we have Ei − Ej = 0, which yields
Ntj + Fj −Nti − Fi = 0 (38)
Note that tj > ti implies Fj ≥ Fi, and vice versa.
Therefore, the above requires that ti = tj ∀i, j. Substituting
this into Ei = 0 yields Fi = 0. Given ti = tj , Fi is an
increasing function of pi that crosses 0 at pi = p∗i . Hence, the
only pi that satisfies Fi = 0 is p∗i . Since this holds for all i,
the unique stable point of operation is pi = p∗i ∀i.
B. Stability analysis
We next conduct a stability analysis of DOC to configure
the parameters of the PI controller. Following the definition
of a PI controller [15], station i computes the value of Pi
at interval Θ′ as a function of the error values measured by
3While the existence of a unique point of operation can be easily guaranteed
in a centralized system where the configuration of all stations is imposed by a
central entity, it is much harder to guarantee in a distributed system in which
each station chooses its own configuration.
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the station in the current and previous intervals based on the
following equation:
Pi(Θ
′) = KpEi(Θ
′) +Ki
Θ′−1∑
Θ=0
Ei(Θ) (39)
where Kp and Ki are the parameters of the controller that we
have to configure.
The DOC system shown in Fig. 2 can be expressed in the
form of Fig. 4. In this figure, C represents the function imple-
mented by the controllers, which computes the control signals
Pi taking as input the error signals Ei, and H represents the
wireless system which provides the error signals Ei measured
by the stations based on the control signals Pi. The control and
error signals in the figure are given by the following vectors:
P = (P1, . . . , PN )
T (40)
and
E = (E1, . . . , EN )
T (41)
Our control system consists of one PI controller in each
station i that takes Ei as input and gives Pi as output.
Following this, we can express the relationship between E
and P as follows
P(z) = C ·E(z) (42)
where
C =


CPI(z) 0 0 . . . 0
0 CPI(z) 0 . . . 0
0 0 CPI(z) . . . 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 . . . CPI(z)


(43)
with CPI(z) being the z transform of a PI controller [15],
CPI(z) = Kp +
Ki
z − 1
(44)
In order to analyze our system from a control theoretic
standpoint, we need to characterize the wireless system with a
transfer function H that takes P as input and has E as output.
Eq. (26) gives a nonlinear relationship between E and P. In
order to express this relationship as a transfer function, we
linearize it when the system suffers small perturbations around
its stable point of operation. We then study the linearized
model and force that it is stable. Note that the stability of the
linearized model guarantees that our system is locally stable.4
4A similar approach was used in [16] to analyze RED from a control
theoretic standpoint.
We express the perturbations around the stable point of
operation as follows:
P = P∗ + δP (45)
where P∗ is the stable point of operation as given by Eq. (24)
with p = p∗.
With the above, the perturbations suffered by E can be
approximated by
δE = H · δP (46)
where
H =


∂E1
∂P1
∂E1
∂P2
. . . ∂E1
∂PN
∂E2
∂P1
∂E2
∂P2
. . . ∂E2
∂PN
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
∂EN
∂P1
∂EN
∂P2
. . . ∂EN
∂PN

 (47)
In order to compute these partial derivatives we proceed as
follows. The error signal Ei can be expressed as
Ei = Ttotal
∑
j 6=i (ps,j(Tj+(e−1)τ)−ps,i(Ti+(e−1)τ))∑
j ps,jTj+(1−ps)τ
− Fi (48)
The above can be rewritten as a function of P given by
Ei = Ttotal
∑
j 6=i (Pj − Pi)∑
j Pj −
ps
pe
(e− 1)τ + 1−ps
pe
τ
− Fi (49)
where pe =
∏
i 1− pi.
We start by showing that ∂Fi/∂Pi = 0 at the stable point
of operation. It follows from Eq. (35) that
∂Fi
∂Pi
= 0 ⇐⇒
∂D
∂Pi
= 0 (50)
D can be expressed as
D = Nt∗ − Ttotal
∑
i ps,iTi + ps(e − 1)τ∑
i ps,iTi + (1− ps)τ
(51)
The partial derivative of D can be computed as
∂D
∂Pi
=
∂D
∂pi
∂pi
∂Pi
(52)
Taking the partial derivative of Eq. (51) with respect to pi
and evaluating it at the stable point of operation yields
∂D
∂pi
= Ttotal
(
eτ∑
i ps,iTi + (e− 1)τ
)(
∂ps
∂pi
)
(53)
Since ps takes a maximum at the stable point of operation,
we have that ∂ps/∂pi = 0, which yields ∂D/∂Pi = 0 and
hence
∂Fi
∂Pi
= 0 (54)
The partial derivative of Ei evaluated at the stable point of
operation can then be computed from Eq. (49) as
∂Ei
∂Pi
= −(N − 1)Ttotal
1∑
j Pj
(55)
Following a similar reasoning, it can be seen that
∂Ei
∂Pj
= Ttotal
1∑
j Pj
(56)
8Substituting these expressions in matrix H gives
H = KH


−(N − 1) 1 . . . 1
1 −(N − 1) . . . 1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 1 . . . −(N − 1)


(57)
where
KH = Ttotal
1∑
j Pj
(58)
With the above, we have the linearized system fully charac-
terized by matrices C and H . The next step is to configure the
Kp and Ki parameters of this system. The following theorem
provides the sufficient conditions of {Kp,Ki} for stability:
Theorem 4. The linearized system is guaranteed to be stable
as long as Kp and Ki meet the following conditions:
Ki < Kp +
1
NKH
(59)
Ki > 2Kp −
1
NKH
(60)
Proof: According to (6.22) of [11], we need to verify that
the following transfer function is stable
(I − z−1CH)−1C (61)
Computing the above matrix yields
(I − z−1CH)−1C =


a b b . . . b
b a b . . . b
b b a . . . b
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
b b b . . . a


(62)
where
a =
CPI(z)
N
(
1 +
N − 1
1 +Nz−1KHCPI(z)
)
(63)
b =
CPI(z)
N
(
1−
1
1 +Nz−1KHCPI(z)
)
(64)
Rearranging the terms of the above two equations, we obtain
a =
P1(z)
z2 + a1z + a2
(65)
b =
P2(z)
z2 + a1z + a2
(66)
where P1(z) and P2(z) are polynomials and
a1 = NKHKp − 1 (67)
a2 = NKH(Ki −Kp) (68)
According to Theorem 3.5 of [11], a sufficient condition for
the stability of a transfer function is that the zeros of its pole
polynomial (which is the least common denominator of all
the minors of the transfer function matrix) fall within the unit
circle. Applying this theorem to (I−z−1CH)−1C yields that
the roots of the polynomial z2 + a1z + a2 have to fall inside
the unit circle. This can be ensured by choosing coefficients
{a1, a2} that satisfy the following three conditions [17]: a2 <
1, a1 < a2 + 1 and a1 > −1 − a2. The third condition is
satisfied as long as Ki > 0, while the other two yield Ki <
Kp+1/(NKH) and Ki > 2Kp− 1/(NKH), respectively.
In addition to guaranteeing stability, our goal in the config-
uration of the {Kp,Ki} parameters is to find the right tradeoff
between speed of reaction to changes and oscillations under
steady conditions. To this end, we use the Ziegler-Nichols rules
[18], which have been designed for this purpose. First, we
compute the parameter Ku, defined as the Kp value that leads
to instability when Ki = 0, and the parameter Ti, defined as
the oscillation period under these conditions. Then, Kp and
Ki are configured as follows:
Kp = 0.4Ku (69)
and
Ki =
Kp
0.85Ti
(70)
In order to compute Ku we proceed as follows. From
Eq. (59) with Ki = 0 we have the following condition for
stability
Kp <
1
2NKH
(71)
We take Ku as the value that may turn the system unstable
Ku =
1
2NKH
(72)
and set Kp according to Eq. (69),
Kp =
0.4
2NKH
(73)
With the Kp value that leads to instability, a given set of
input values may change their sign at most every interval,
yielding an oscillation period of two intervals (Ti = 2). Thus,
from Eq. (70),
Ki =
(
1
0.85 · 2
)
0.4
2NKH
(74)
which completes the configuration of the PI controller param-
eters. The stability of this configuration is guaranteed by the
following corollary:
Corollary 1. The Kp and Ki configuration given by Eqs. (73)
and (74) is stable.
Proof: It is easy to see that Eqs. (73) and (74) meet the
conditions of Theorem 4.
V. GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS
In the previous section we have seen that, when all stations
follow the DOC algorithm, they all play with pi = p∗i and
R¯i = R¯
∗
i . In this section we conduct a game theoretic analysis
to show that one or more stations cannot gain any profit
by deviating from DOC. In what follows, we say that a
station is honest or well-behaved when it implements the DOC
algorithm to configure its pi and R¯i parameters, while we
say that it is selfish or misbehaving when it plays a different
strategy from DOC to configure these parameters with the aim
of obtaining some gains.
9The game theoretic analysis conducted in this section as-
sumes that users are rational and want to maximize their
own benefit or utility, which is given by the throughput.
The model is based on the theory of repeated games [19].
With repeated games, time is divided into stages and a player
can take new decisions at each stage based on the observed
behavior of the other players in the previous stages. This
matches our algorithm, where time is divided into intervals and
stations update their configuration at each interval.5 Like other
previous analyses on repeated games [20], [21], we consider
an infinitely repeated game, which is a common assumption
when the players do not know when the game will finish.
A. Single selfish station
While the design of the DOC algorithm in Section III
guarantees that a station cannot gain any profit by playing
with a fixed selfish configuration, selfish stations might still
gain by varying their configuration over time. As an example,
let us consider a naive algorithm that only takes into account
the stations’ behavior in the previous stage. While this algo-
rithm may be effective against a fixed selfish configuration,
it could easily be defeated by a selfish station that alternates
a selfish configuration (pk = 1, R¯k = 0) with an honest one
(pk = p∗k, R¯k = R¯∗k) at every other stage. Since this station
would play selfish when all the others play honest, it would
achieve a significantly higher throughput every other interval,
thus benefiting from its misbehavior.
The above example shows that it is important to make sure
that a selfish station cannot gain any profit no matter how
it varies its configuration over time. The following theorem
confirms the effectiveness of DOC against any (fixed or
variable) selfish strategy. The proof of the theorem relies on
the integrator component of the PI controller, which keeps
track of the aggregated channel time received by all stations
and can thus be used to guarantee that this aggregate does not
exceed a given amount.
Theorem 5. Let us consider a selfish station that uses a pk(Θ)
and R¯k(Θ) configuration that can vary over time. If all the
other stations implement the DOC algorithm, the throughput
received by this station will be no larger than r∗k (where r∗k is
the throughput that station k receives when all stations play
DOC).
Proof: The PI controller computes Pi at a given interval
Θ′ according to the following expression:
Pi(Θ
′) = P initiali +Kp

∑
j 6=i
(tj(Θ
′)− ti(Θ
′))− Fi(Θ
′)


+Ki
Θ′∑
Θ=0

∑
j 6=i
(tj(Θ)− ti(Θ))− Fi(Θ)


(75)
5Note that the game theoretic study conducted in Section III-A was based
on static games instead of repeated ones. The reason is that in Section III-A
we considered a system without penalties and hence we could model it as a
static game where all players only make a single move at the beginning of
the game and (as they are never penalized) do not need to make any further
move during the rest of the game.
Note that with the above, Pi will stay between 0 and a
given maximum value Pmaxi . If at some time Pi reaches a
Pmaxi value such that pi = 1, then we have tj = 0 for j 6= i
and Fi > −(N − 1)ti, which yields Ei < 0 and therefore Pi
decreases. Similarly, if at some time Pi reaches 0, then ti = 0
and F ≤ 0, which yields Ei > 0 and therefore Pi increases.
Considering that 0 ≤ Pi(Θ′) ≤ Pmaxi , the above equation
can be expressed as
∑
Θ

∑
j 6=i
(tj(Θ)− ti(Θ))− Fi(Θ)

 = K (76)
where K is a bounded value.
Let us consider the case in which there is a selfish station
that changes its configuration over time and receives a channel
time tk(Θ) while the other stations are well-behaved and use
the same configuration obtaining the same channel time t(Θ).
Then the above can be expressed as∑
Θ
tk(Θ) =
∑
Θ
(t(Θ) + Fi(Θ)) +K (77)
Let us consider now a given interval Θ. From Eq. (30) we
have
Fi(Θ) ≤
1
N − 1
(t∗ − tk(Θ)− (N − 1)t(Θ)) (78)
which yields
(N − 1)t(Θ) + tk(Θ) + (N − 1)Fi(Θ) ≤ Nt
∗ (79)
Since the above equation is satisfied for all Θ,∑
Θ
(N − 1)t(Θ) + tk(Θ) + (N − 1)Fi(Θ) ≤
∑
Θ
Nt∗
(80)
Furthermore, from Eq. (77),
(N−1)
∑
Θ
tk(Θ) = (N−1)
∑
Θ
(t(Θ) + Fi(Θ))+(N−1)K
(81)
Adding the above two equations yields
N
∑
Θ
tk(Θ) ≤ N
∑
Θ
t∗ + (N − 1)K (82)
from which ∑
Θ
tk(Θ) ≤
∑
Θ
t∗ +
N − 1
N
K (83)
If we consider a very long period of time, the constant term
in the above equation can be neglected and we obtain∑
t
tk(Θ) ≤
∑
t
t∗ (84)
From the above, we have that the selfish station cannot
receive more channel time with a selfish strategy than by
playing DOC and, following the reasoning of Section III-B,
therefore cannot obtain more throughput than it would obtain
by playing DOC, i.e.
rk ≤ r
∗
k (85)
which proves the theorem.
From the above theorem follows Corollary 2.
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Corollary 2. A state in which all stations play DOC (All-
DOC) is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Proof: According to Theorem 5, if all stations but one
play DOC, then the best response of this station is to play
DOC as well since it cannot benefit from playing a different
strategy. Thus, All-DOC is a Nash equilibrium.
This shows that, if all stations start playing with no previous
history, then none of them can gain by deviating from DOC. In
addition, in repeated games it is also important to ensure that,
if at some point the game has a given history, a selfish station
cannot take advantage of this history to gain profit by playing a
strategy different from DOC. The following theorem confirms
that All-DOC is a Nash equilibrium of any subgame (where
a subgame is defined as the game resulting from starting to
play with a certain history). Therefore, a selfish station cannot
benefit by deviating from DOC independently of the previous
history of the game.
Theorem 6. All-DOC is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
of the game.
Proof: Since the proof of Theorem 5 is independent of
the past history and can therefore be applied to any subgame,
All-DOC is a Nash equilibrium of any subgame.
B. Multiple selfish stations
The above results show the effectiveness of DOC against
a single selfish station. In the following, we tackle the case
when there are multiple selfish stations.
The following theorem shows that, by following a strategy
different from DOC, multiple stations cannot gain any aggre-
gated channel time.
Theorem 7. Let us consider a scenario with m selfish stations.
If all other stations play DOC, the selfish stations cannot gain
any aggregated channel time.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let us consider that
stations i = {1, . . . ,m} are selfish. Applying a reasoning
similar to Theorem 5 leads to
m∑
i=1
∑
Θ
ti(Θ) ≤ m
∑
Θ
t∗ (86)
As the left hand side of the above equation is the aggregated
channel time obtained by the selfish stations, and the right
hand side is the aggregated channel time that they would obtain
if the played DOC, this proves the theorem.
The above theorem shows that, if there is some selfish
station that experiences a gain, this is because there is some
other station that suffers a loss.
Corollary 3. Let us consider a scenario with m selfish
stations. If all other stations play DOC and a selfish station k
receives a throughput larger than r∗k , this means that there
exists another selfish station l that receives a throughput
smaller than r∗l (where r∗k and r∗l are the throughputs obtained
by stations k and l if all stations played DOC).
Proof: If there is some station k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} for
which rk > r∗k, then we have that this station receives more
channel time than it would receive if all stations played DOC.
Since, according to Theorem 7, the selfish stations cannot
gain any aggregated channel time, this means that there must
necessarily be some other station l ∈ {1, . . . ,m} that receives
less channel time. This implies that rl < r∗l , which proves the
corollary.
Based on the above, we argue that DOC is effective against
multiple selfish stations, since two or more selfish stations
cannot simultaneously gain profit and therefore do not have an
incentive to play a coordinated strategy different from DOC.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section we evaluate DOC by means of simulation
to show that (i) in the absence of selfish stations, DOC pro-
vides optimal performance while behaving stably and reacting
quickly to changes, and (ii) selfish stations cannot benefit by
following a strategy different from DOC.
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that different obser-
vations of the channel conditions are independent, and the
available transmission rate for a given SNR is given by the
Shannon channel capacity:
R(h) = Wlog2(1 + ρ|h|
2) bits/s (87)
where W is the channel bandwidth, ρ is the normalized
average SNR and h is the random gain of Rayleigh fading.
We implemented the DOC algorithm in OMNET++6. In the
simulations, we set W = 107, T /τ = 10 and the interval of
the controller Ttotal = 105τ . For all results, 95% confidence
intervals are below 0.5%.
A. Throughput evaluation
For the throughput evaluation, we compare the performance
of DOC to the following approaches: (i) the static optimal
configuration obtained in Section II (‘static configuration’),
(ii) the configuration proposed in [3] (‘DOS’), and (iii)
an approach that does not perform opportunistic schedul-
ing but always transmits after successful contention (‘non-
opportunistic’).
We consider a scenario with N = 10 stations, half of
them with a normalized SNR of ρ1 = 1 and the other half
with a normalized SNR ρ2 that varies from 1 to 10. Fig. 5
shows
∑
i log(ri), the metric that proportional fairness aims
at maximizing, as a function of ρ2. We observe that DOC
performs at the same level as the benchmark given by the
static configuration, while the other two approaches (DOS and
non-opportunistic) provide a substantially lower performance.
For above scenario with ρ2 = 4, Fig. 6 depicts the
individual throughput allocation of two stations (where r1 is
the throughput of a station with ρ1 and r2 that of a station with
ρ2). DOC is effective in driving the system to the optimal
point of operation and provides the same throughput as the
static configuration. In contrast, the DOS approach exhibits a
high degree of unfairness and provides the station with high
SNR with a much higher throughput. The non-opportunistic
approach provides a good level of fairness but has lower
6http://www.omnetpp.org/
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throughput due to the lack of opportunistic scheduling. In
conclusion, the proposed DOC algorithm provides a good
tradeoff between overall throughput and fairness.
B. Selfish station with fixed configuration
We verify that a station cannot obtain more throughput with
a selfish configuration than by playing DOC in a scenario with
N = 10 stations, 5 of them with ρ1 = 1 and the other half
(including the selfish station) with ρ2 = 4. The selfish station
uses a fixed configuration and all other stations implement
DOC. Fig. 7 shows the throughput of the selfish station for
different {pk, R¯k} configurations of the selfish station. This is
compared to the throughput that the station would obtain if it
played DOC, given by the horizontal line.
We observe that none of the selfish configurations provides
more throughput than DOC. Furthermore, rk is far from r∗k for
pk < p
∗
k and close to r∗k for pk > p∗k. This is a consequence
of the design of Fi in Section III.E. For pk < p∗k, the access
probabilities of the honest stations satisfy pi < p∗i . With these
values of p, Fi takes negative values that are large in absolute
terms, which means that, according to Eq. (27), the selfish
station receives much less channel time than the other stations
and hence a throughput far from r∗k. For pk > p∗k, we have
pi > p
∗
i . These p lead to Fi values that are close to the upper
bound and, as the upper bound corresponds to tk = t∗, this
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Fig. 7. Throughput of a selfish station for fixed configurations of {pk, R¯k}.
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gives a throughput close to r∗k for the selfish station. In Section
VI-E we show that this design leads to a robust behavior
against selfish stations and transient conditions.
Fig. 8 analyzes the impact of fixed selfish configurations
for a range of different N and ρ2 values. It shows the largest
throughput that a selfish station can receive with a fixed
configuration, which is obtained by performing an exhaustive
search over the {pk, R¯k} space. This throughput is compared
against the one that the station would receive if it played DOC.
Again we observe that the station never benefits from playing
selfishly, which validates the design of the DOC algorithm.
C. Selfish station with variable configuration
According to Theorem 5, a selfish station cannot benefit
from changing its configuration over time. For verification,
we evaluate the throughput obtained by a selfish station with
different adaptive strategies. These strategies are inspired by
the schemes used in [20], [22] for a similar purpose. The
underlying principle of all of them is that the cheating station
uses a selfish configuration to gain throughput and, when it
realizes that it is not gaining throughput, it assumes that it
has been detected as selfish and switches back to the honest
configuration to avoid being punished.
In particular, we consider the following strategies. The
‘adaptive pk strategy’ fixes the R¯k configuration of the selfish
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station to its optimal value, R¯k = R¯∗k, and modifies the pk
configuration as follows: the station uses a selfish configura-
tion of pk = 1 as long as it obtains some gain, i.e. rk > r∗k.
When rk drops below r∗k, the station switches to the honest
configuration, pk = p∗k, and stays with this configuration as
long as rk stays below 0.95r∗k. It switches back to pk = 1 when
rk grows above 0.95r∗k. The ‘adaptive R¯k strategy’ fixes the
pk configuration to the optimal value, pk = p∗k, and modifies
the R¯k configuration following a strategy similar to the one
above: the station uses a selfish configuration of R¯k = 0 (i.e., it
uses all transmission opportunities) as long as it obtains some
gain and switches to the honest configuration when it stops
benefiting. Finally, the ‘adaptive pk and R¯k strategy’ follows
a similar behavior to the previous ones but adapts both the pk
and the R¯k configuration.
Fig. 9 compares the throughput obtained with each of the
above strategies against the one with DOC for different values
of N . As expected, when all other stations play DOC, a given
station maximizes its payoff playing DOC as well, as it obtains
a larger throughput than with any of the other strategies,
confirming the result of Theorem 5.
D. Multiple selfish stations
Corollary 3 states that multiple selfish stations cannot si-
multaneously benefit by deviating from DOC, as it is only
possible that one or more of the selfish stations experience
some throughput gains if there are some other selfish stations
that suffer some loss.
To validate the result, we consider a network with N = 10
stations including two selfish stations, half of them (including
one of the selfish stations) with ρ1 = 1 and the other
half (including the other selfish station) with ρ2 = 4. We
perform an exhaustive search over a wide range of {pi, R¯i}
configurations of the two selfish stations. The results of this ex-
periment are depicted in Fig. 10, which shows the throughput
obtained by the two selfish stations (rk and rl) for each of the
configurations used in the exhaustive search. The figure also
shows the throughput of the two stations when they both play
DOC. There is no configuration that simultaneously improves
the throughput of the two selfish stations, which confirms the
result of Corollary 3.
 0
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1  1.2  1.4  1.6  1.8
r l 
[M
bp
s]
rk [Mbps]
DOC
rk > rk
*
rl > rl
*
Fig. 10. Throughput obtained by multiple selfish stations.
We also observe from the figure that the region of feasible
allocations has a tringular shape. This is a consequence of
Theorem 7: since the maximum aggregated channel time that
the two stations can obtain is fixed, any throughput increase
in one station leads to a decrease in the other station of the
same amount scaled by a constant factor that depends on the
respective radio conditions.
E. Robustness to selfish behavior and transient conditions
For a setting similar to that of Fig. 7 with 10 stations,
half of them with ρ1 = 1 and half with ρ2 = 4, and
one selfish station with a fixed configuration and ρ2 = 4,
we investigate the overall throughput of the wireless system.
Again, the throughput obtained when all stations play DOC
is given by the horizontal line. From Fig. 11 we see that the
overall throughput is close to optimal for low values of the
access probability pk of the selfish station and only gradually
decreases for high values of pk. For low values of pk, well-
behaved stations contend with a higher access probability than
the selfish station which yields an almost optimal throughput.
For high values of pk, the selfish station has to be punished
which unavoidably results in some throughput loss. However,
the level of punishment is minimized to avoid driving the
collision probability to unnecessarily high levels that harm
the overall throughput. Hence, even for very high pk and the
subsequent high rate of contention collisions, some throughput
remains for the well-behaved stations (note from Fig. 7 that
the maximum throughput of the selfish station is less than
∼1.8 Mbps). We conclude that, as intended, the design of Fi
maintains a level of throughput as high as possible for the
well-behaved stations.
In addition to robustness against selfish behavior (as seen
above), our design of Fi also aims at providing robustness in
transient conditions. We investigate this through the following
experiment: in a wireless network with 10 stations, a new
station joins every 100 intervals, with its pi initially set to
0.5, stays for 50 intervals and then leaves the system. With
our design of Fi the total throughput obtained in this scenario
is equal to 9.67 Mbps, while with a design of Fi 10 times
smaller, it is only 6.52 Mbps, confirming the robustness of
DOC to transient network conditions.
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Fig. 11. Total system throughput in the presence of a selfish station.
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 [M
bp
s]
Kp,Ki
 0.5
 1
 1.5
 2
 2.5
 3
 3.5
 4
 0  1000  2000  3000  4000  5000  6000  7000  8000  9000  10000
Interval
Kp*10,Ki*10
Fig. 12. Stability analysis of the parameters of the PI controller.
F. Parameter setting of the PI controller
The main objective in the setting of the Kp and Ki pa-
rameters proposed in Section IV is to achieve a good tradeoff
between stability and speed of reaction.
To validate that our system guarantees a stable behavior, we
analyze the evolution over time of the throughput received by
a station for the chosen {Kp,Ki} setting and a configuration
of these parameters 10 times larger, in a wireless network
with N = 10 stations. We observe from Fig. 12 that with
the proposed setting (labeled “Kp,Ki”), the throughput shows
only minor deviations around its average value, while for a
larger setting (labeled “Kp ∗ 10,Ki ∗ 10”), it shows unstable
behavior with drastic oscillations.
To investigate the speed with which the system reacts
against selfish stations, we use a wireless network with
N = 10 stations where initially all stations play DOC and,
after 50 intervals, one station turns selfish and changes its
access probability to pk = 1. Fig. 13 shows the evolution of
the throughput of the selfish station over time. We observe
from the figure that with our setting (labeled “Kp,Ki”),
the system reacts quickly, and after a few tens of intervals
the selfish station no longer benefits from its behavior. In
contrast, for a setting of these parameters 10 times smaller
(labeled “Kp/10,Ki/10”), the reaction is very slow and it
takes almost 2000 intervals until the station stops benefiting
from its misbehavior.
The results show that with a larger setting of {Kp,Ki}
the system suffers from instability while with a smaller one it
reacts too slowly. Hence, the proposed setting provides a good
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tradeoff between stability and speed of reaction.
G. Impact of channel coherence time
Our channel model is based on the assumption that different
observations of the channel conditions are independent. In
order to understand the impact of this assumption, we repeat
the experiment of Fig. 6 using Jakes’ channel model [23] to
obtain the different channel observations. The results, for a
Doppler frequency of fD = 2pi/100τ , are given in Fig. 14.
We observe that the throughput obtained is slightly smaller
than that of Fig. 6. This is due to the fact that when the
channel is bad, a station does not transmit after a successful
contention and therefore it takes (on average) a shorter time
until the next successful contention of this station. As a result,
a station accesses more often the channel when it is bad than
when it is good, which introduces a bias that slightly reduces
the throughput. Overall, the results are sufficiently similar to
those of Fig. 6 to conclude that our assumption on the channel
model only has a minor impact on the resulting performance.
We further investigate whether, in the above scenario, a
station with ρ2 = 4 could obtain more throughput by using a
selfish configuration. While the station obtains 1.752 Mbps
with DOC, it can obtain up to 1.757 Mbps with a selfish
configuration. Note that this increase is not due to the DOC
design, as no configuration gives more channel time to the
selfish station, but rather due to the fact that the transmission
rate threshold of [3] is not truly optimal under Jakes’ channel
model. In any case, the throughput gain of the selfish station
is negligible.
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H. Discrete set of transmission rates
While all previous experiments assumed continuous rates,
our analysis as well as the design of the DOC algorithm
does not rely on any assumption on the mapping of SNR to
transmission rates and therefore works for any (continuous or
discrete) mapping function. To show that DOC is effective
when only a set of discrete rates is allowed, we analyze a
wireless system in which the only transmission rates available
are {1, 2, 5.5, 12, 24, 48, 54} Mbps. For a given SNR, we
choose the largest available transmission rate that is smaller
than the one given by Eq. (87).
We repeat the experiment of Fig. 9 with discrete rates, and
compare the throughput of a selfish station against the through-
put that this station obtains when it plays DOC. The results
in Fig. 15 confirm that a station cannot benefit from playing
selfish. We further observe that, as expected, throughputs are
smaller than those of Fig. 9 since, with the discrete mapping
of SNR to rates, smaller transmission rates are achieved on
average.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Recently proposed Distributed Opportunistic Scheduling
(DOS) techniques provide throughput gains in wireless net-
works that do not have a centralized scheduler. One of the
problems of these techniques is, however, that they are vulner-
able to malicious users which may configure their parameters
to obtain a greater share of the wireless resources at the
expense of other, well-behaved, users. In this paper we address
the problem by proposing a novel algorithm that prevents such
throughput gains from selfish behavior.
With our approach, upon detecting a selfish user, stations
react by using a more aggressive parameter configuration
which serves to punish the selfish station. Such an adaptive
algorithm has to carefully adjust the reaction against a selfish
station to avoid that the system turns unstable by overreacting.
A key aspect of the paper is that we use of tools from the fields
of multivariable control theory combined with game theory in
the design of our algorithm.
We conducted a control theoretic analysis of the DOC
algorithm that shows that, when all the stations in the wireless
network run DOC, the system behaves stably and converges to
the desired configuration. We then used this control theoretic
analysis to find a setting that provides a good tradeoff between
stability and speed of reaction. In addition, we performed a
game theoretic analysis of DOC based on repeated games to
evaluate its behavior when there are one or more selfish sta-
tions in the wireless network. The analysis shows that neither
a single selfish station nor several cooperating selfish stations
can benefit from playing a strategy different from DOC, and
that this holds for fixed as well as for adaptive strategies.
Furthermore, the DOC strategy represents a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium.
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